First step in this merge. Mostly a bzr merge and then a cleanup of conflicts

and parts I want to/have to redo (because of ui-fix).

1 files changed, 1731 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/otr.c b/otr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c6ba32a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/otr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1731 @@
+  /********************************************************************\
+  * BitlBee -- An IRC to other IM-networks gateway                     *
+  *                                                                    *
+  * Copyright 2002-2008 Wilmer van der Gaast and others                *
+  \********************************************************************/
+
+/*
+  OTR support (cf. http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/)
+  
+  2008, Sven Moritz Hallberg <pesco@khjk.org>
+  (c) and funded by stonedcoder.org
+    
+  files used to store OTR data:
+    <configdir>/<nick>.otr_keys
+    <configdir>/<nick>.otr_fprints
+    
+  top-level todos: (search for TODO for more ;-))
+    integrate otr_load/otr_save with existing storage backends
+    per-account policy settings
+    per-user policy settings
+*/
+
+/*
+  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+  (at your option) any later version.
+
+  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+  GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License with
+  the Debian GNU/Linux distribution in /usr/share/common-licenses/GPL;
+  if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place,
+  Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
+*/
+
+#include "bitlbee.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OTR
+#include "irc.h"
+#include "otr.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+
+/** OTR interface routines for the OtrlMessageAppOps struct: **/
+
+OtrlPolicy op_policy(void *opdata, ConnContext *context);
+
+void op_create_privkey(void *opdata, const char *accountname, const char *protocol);
+
+int op_is_logged_in(void *opdata, const char *accountname, const char *protocol,
+	const char *recipient);
+
+void op_inject_message(void *opdata, const char *accountname, const char *protocol,
+	const char *recipient, const char *message);
+
+int op_display_otr_message(void *opdata, const char *accountname, const char *protocol,
+	const char *username, const char *msg);
+
+void op_new_fingerprint(void *opdata, OtrlUserState us, const char *accountname,
+	const char *protocol, const char *username, unsigned char fingerprint[20]);
+
+void op_write_fingerprints(void *opdata);
+
+void op_gone_secure(void *opdata, ConnContext *context);
+
+void op_gone_insecure(void *opdata, ConnContext *context);
+
+void op_still_secure(void *opdata, ConnContext *context, int is_reply);
+
+void op_log_message(void *opdata, const char *message);
+
+int op_max_message_size(void *opdata, ConnContext *context);
+
+const char *op_account_name(void *opdata, const char *account, const char *protocol);
+
+
+/** otr sub-command handlers: **/
+
+void cmd_otr_connect(irc_t *irc, char **args);
+void cmd_otr_disconnect(irc_t *irc, char **args);
+void cmd_otr_smp(irc_t *irc, char **args);
+void cmd_otr_trust(irc_t *irc, char **args);
+void cmd_otr_info(irc_t *irc, char **args);
+void cmd_otr_keygen(irc_t *irc, char **args);
+void cmd_otr_forget(irc_t *irc, char **args);
+
+const command_t otr_commands[] = {
+	{ "connect",     1, &cmd_otr_connect,    0 },
+	{ "disconnect",  1, &cmd_otr_disconnect, 0 },
+	{ "smp",         2, &cmd_otr_smp,        0 },
+	{ "trust",       6, &cmd_otr_trust,      0 },
+	{ "info",        0, &cmd_otr_info,       0 },
+	{ "keygen",      1, &cmd_otr_keygen,     0 },
+	{ "forget",      2, &cmd_otr_forget,     0 },
+	{ NULL }
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+	void *fst;
+	void *snd;
+} pair_t;	
+
+
+/** misc. helpers/subroutines: **/
+
+/* check whether we are already generating a key for a given account */
+int keygen_in_progress(irc_t *irc, const char *handle, const char *protocol);
+
+/* start background process to generate a (new) key for a given account */
+void otr_keygen(irc_t *irc, const char *handle, const char *protocol);
+
+/* main function for the forked keygen slave */
+void keygen_child_main(OtrlUserState us, int infd, int outfd);
+
+/* mainloop handler for when a keygen finishes */
+gboolean keygen_finish_handler(gpointer data, gint fd, b_input_condition cond);
+
+/* copy the contents of file a to file b, overwriting it if it exists */
+void copyfile(const char *a, const char *b);
+
+/* read one line of input from a stream, excluding trailing newline */
+void myfgets(char *s, int size, FILE *stream);
+
+/* some yes/no handlers */
+void yes_keygen(void *data);
+void yes_forget_fingerprint(void *data);
+void yes_forget_context(void *data);
+void yes_forget_key(void *data);
+
+/* helper to make sure accountname and protocol match the incoming "opdata" */
+struct im_connection *check_imc(void *opdata, const char *accountname,
+	const char *protocol);
+
+/* determine the nick for a given handle/protocol pair
+   returns "handle/protocol" if not found */
+const char *peernick(irc_t *irc, const char *handle, const char *protocol);
+
+/* turn a hexadecimal digit into its numerical value */
+int hexval(char a);
+
+/* determine the user_t for a given handle/protocol pair
+   returns NULL if not found */
+user_t *peeruser(irc_t *irc, const char *handle, const char *protocol);
+
+/* handle SMP TLVs from a received message */
+void otr_handle_smp(struct im_connection *ic, const char *handle, OtrlTLV *tlvs);
+
+/* update op/voice flag of given user according to encryption state and settings
+   returns 0 if neither op_buddies nor voice_buddies is set to "encrypted",
+   i.e. msgstate should be announced seperately */
+int otr_update_modeflags(irc_t *irc, user_t *u);
+
+/* show general info about the OTR subsystem; called by 'otr info' */
+void show_general_otr_info(irc_t *irc);
+
+/* show info about a given OTR context */
+void show_otr_context_info(irc_t *irc, ConnContext *ctx);
+
+/* show the list of fingerprints associated with a given context */
+void show_fingerprints(irc_t *irc, ConnContext *ctx);
+
+/* find a fingerprint by prefix (given as any number of hex strings) */
+Fingerprint *match_fingerprint(irc_t *irc, ConnContext *ctx, const char **args);
+
+/* find a private key by fingerprint prefix (given as any number of hex strings) */
+OtrlPrivKey *match_privkey(irc_t *irc, const char **args);
+
+
+/*** routines declared in otr.h: ***/
+
+void otr_init(void)
+{
+	OTRL_INIT;
+	
+	/* fill global OtrlMessageAppOps */
+	global.otr_ops.policy = &op_policy;
+	global.otr_ops.create_privkey = &op_create_privkey;
+	global.otr_ops.is_logged_in = &op_is_logged_in;
+	global.otr_ops.inject_message = &op_inject_message;
+	global.otr_ops.notify = NULL;
+	global.otr_ops.display_otr_message = &op_display_otr_message;
+	global.otr_ops.update_context_list = NULL;
+	global.otr_ops.protocol_name = NULL;
+	global.otr_ops.protocol_name_free = NULL;
+	global.otr_ops.new_fingerprint = &op_new_fingerprint;
+	global.otr_ops.write_fingerprints = &op_write_fingerprints;
+	global.otr_ops.gone_secure = &op_gone_secure;
+	global.otr_ops.gone_insecure = &op_gone_insecure;
+	global.otr_ops.still_secure = &op_still_secure;
+	global.otr_ops.log_message = &op_log_message;
+	global.otr_ops.max_message_size = &op_max_message_size;
+	global.otr_ops.account_name = &op_account_name;
+	global.otr_ops.account_name_free = NULL;
+}
+
+otr_t *otr_new(void)
+{
+	otr_t *otr = g_new0(otr_t, 1);
+
+	otr->us = otrl_userstate_create();
+	
+	return otr;
+}
+
+void otr_free(otr_t *otr)
+{
+	otrl_userstate_free(otr->us);
+	if(otr->keygen) {
+		kill(otr->keygen, SIGTERM);
+		waitpid(otr->keygen, NULL, 0);
+		/* TODO: remove stale keygen tempfiles */
+	}
+	if(otr->to)
+		fclose(otr->to);
+	if(otr->from)
+		fclose(otr->from);
+	while(otr->todo) {
+		kg_t *p = otr->todo;
+		otr->todo = p->next;
+		g_free(p);
+	}
+	g_free(otr);
+}
+
+void otr_load(irc_t *irc)
+{
+	char s[512];
+	account_t *a;
+	gcry_error_t e;
+	gcry_error_t enoent = gcry_error_from_errno(ENOENT);
+	int kg=0;
+
+	g_snprintf(s, 511, "%s%s.otr_keys", global.conf->configdir, irc->nick);
+	e = otrl_privkey_read(irc->otr->us, s);
+	if(e && e!=enoent) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "otr load: %s: %s", s, gcry_strerror(e));
+	}
+	g_snprintf(s, 511, "%s%s.otr_fprints", global.conf->configdir, irc->nick);
+	e = otrl_privkey_read_fingerprints(irc->otr->us, s, NULL, NULL);
+	if(e && e!=enoent) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "otr load: %s: %s", s, gcry_strerror(e));
+	}
+	
+	/* check for otr keys on all accounts */
+	for(a=irc->accounts; a; a=a->next) {
+		kg = otr_check_for_key(a) || kg;
+	}
+	if(kg) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "Notice: "
+			"The accounts above do not have OTR encryption keys associated with them, yet. "
+			"These keys are now being generated in the background. "
+			"You will be notified as they are completed. "
+			"It is not necessary to wait; "
+			"BitlBee can be used normally during key generation. "
+			"You may safely ignore this message if you don't know what OTR is. ;)");
+	}
+}
+
+void otr_save(irc_t *irc)
+{
+	char s[512];
+	gcry_error_t e;
+
+	g_snprintf(s, 511, "%s%s.otr_fprints", global.conf->configdir, irc->nick);
+	e = otrl_privkey_write_fingerprints(irc->otr->us, s);
+	if(e) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "otr save: %s: %s", s, gcry_strerror(e));
+	}
+	chmod(s, 0600);
+}
+
+void otr_remove(const char *nick)
+{
+	char s[512];
+	
+	g_snprintf(s, 511, "%s%s.otr_keys", global.conf->configdir, nick);
+	unlink(s);
+	g_snprintf(s, 511, "%s%s.otr_fprints", global.conf->configdir, nick);
+	unlink(s);
+}
+
+void otr_rename(const char *onick, const char *nnick)
+{
+	char s[512], t[512];
+	
+	g_snprintf(s, 511, "%s%s.otr_keys", global.conf->configdir, onick);
+	g_snprintf(t, 511, "%s%s.otr_keys", global.conf->configdir, nnick);
+	rename(s,t);
+	g_snprintf(s, 511, "%s%s.otr_fprints", global.conf->configdir, onick);
+	g_snprintf(t, 511, "%s%s.otr_fprints", global.conf->configdir, nnick);
+	rename(s,t);
+}
+
+int otr_check_for_key(account_t *a)
+{
+	irc_t *irc = a->irc;
+	OtrlPrivKey *k;
+	
+	/* don't do OTR on certain (not classic IM) protocols, e.g. twitter */
+	if(a->prpl->options & OPT_NOOTR) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+	
+	k = otrl_privkey_find(irc->otr->us, a->user, a->prpl->name);
+	if(k) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "otr: %s/%s ready", a->user, a->prpl->name);
+		return 0;
+	} if(keygen_in_progress(irc, a->user, a->prpl->name)) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "otr: keygen for %s/%s already in progress", a->user, a->prpl->name);
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "otr: starting background keygen for %s/%s", a->user, a->prpl->name);
+		otr_keygen(irc, a->user, a->prpl->name);
+		return 1;
+	}
+}
+
+char *otr_handle_message(struct im_connection *ic, const char *handle, const char *msg)
+{
+	int ignore_msg;
+	char *newmsg = NULL;
+	OtrlTLV *tlvs = NULL;
+	char *colormsg;
+	
+	/* don't do OTR on certain (not classic IM) protocols, e.g. twitter */
+	if(ic->acc->prpl->options & OPT_NOOTR) {
+		return (g_strdup(msg));
+	}
+	
+	ignore_msg = otrl_message_receiving(ic->irc->otr->us, &global.otr_ops, ic,
+		ic->acc->user, ic->acc->prpl->name, handle, msg, &newmsg,
+		&tlvs, NULL, NULL);
+
+	otr_handle_smp(ic, handle, tlvs);
+	
+	if(ignore_msg) {
+		/* this was an internal OTR protocol message */
+		return NULL;
+	} else if(!newmsg) {
+		/* this was a non-OTR message */
+		return g_strdup(msg);
+	} else {
+		/* OTR has processed this message */
+		ConnContext *context = otrl_context_find(ic->irc->otr->us, handle,
+			ic->acc->user, ic->acc->prpl->name, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if(context && context->msgstate == OTRL_MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED &&
+		   set_getbool(&ic->irc->set, "color_encrypted")) {
+			/* color according to f'print trust */
+			int color;
+			const char *trust = context->active_fingerprint->trust;
+			if(trust && trust[0] != '\0')
+				color=3;   /* green */
+			else
+				color=5;   /* red */
+
+			if(newmsg[0] == ',') {
+				/* could be a problem with the color code */
+				/* insert a space between color spec and message */
+				colormsg = g_strdup_printf("\x03%.2d %s\x0F", color, newmsg);
+			} else {
+				colormsg = g_strdup_printf("\x03%.2d%s\x0F", color, newmsg);
+			}
+		} else {
+			colormsg = g_strdup(newmsg);
+		}
+		otrl_message_free(newmsg);
+		return colormsg;
+	}
+}
+
+int otr_send_message(struct im_connection *ic, const char *handle, const char *msg, int flags)
+{	
+	int st;
+	char *otrmsg = NULL;
+	ConnContext *ctx = NULL;
+
+	/* don't do OTR on certain (not classic IM) protocols, e.g. twitter */
+	if(ic->acc->prpl->options & OPT_NOOTR) {
+		return (ic->acc->prpl->buddy_msg(ic, handle, msg, flags));
+	}
+	
+	st = otrl_message_sending(ic->irc->otr->us, &global.otr_ops, ic,
+		ic->acc->user, ic->acc->prpl->name, handle,
+		msg, NULL, &otrmsg, NULL, NULL);
+	if(st) {
+		return st;
+	}
+
+	ctx = otrl_context_find(ic->irc->otr->us,
+			handle, ic->acc->user, ic->acc->prpl->name,
+			1, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+	if(otrmsg) {
+		if(!ctx) {
+			otrl_message_free(otrmsg);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		st = otrl_message_fragment_and_send(&global.otr_ops, ic, ctx,
+			otrmsg, OTRL_FRAGMENT_SEND_ALL, NULL);
+		otrl_message_free(otrmsg);
+	} else {
+		/* note: otrl_message_sending handles policy, so that if REQUIRE_ENCRYPTION is set,
+		   this case does not occur */
+		st = ic->acc->prpl->buddy_msg( ic, (char *)handle, (char *)msg, flags );
+	}
+	
+	return st;
+}
+
+void cmd_otr(irc_t *irc, char **args)
+{
+	const command_t *cmd;
+	
+	if(!args[0])
+		return;
+	
+	if(!args[1])
+		return;
+	
+	for(cmd=otr_commands; cmd->command; cmd++) {
+		if(strcmp(cmd->command, args[1]) == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	
+	if(!cmd->command) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: unknown subcommand \"%s\", see \x02help otr\x02",
+			args[0], args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	if(!args[cmd->required_parameters+1]) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s %s: not enough arguments (%d req.)",
+			args[0], args[1], cmd->required_parameters);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	cmd->execute(irc, args+1);
+}
+
+
+/*** OTR "MessageAppOps" callbacks for global.otr_ui: ***/
+
+OtrlPolicy op_policy(void *opdata, ConnContext *context)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic = check_imc(opdata, context->accountname, context->protocol);
+	const char *p;
+	
+	/* policy override during keygen: if we're missing the key for context but are currently
+	   generating it, then that's as much as we can do. => temporarily return NEVER. */
+	if(keygen_in_progress(ic->irc, context->accountname, context->protocol) &&
+	   !otrl_privkey_find(ic->irc->otr->us, context->accountname, context->protocol))
+		return OTRL_POLICY_NEVER;
+
+	p = set_getstr(&ic->irc->set, "otr_policy");
+	if(!strcmp(p, "never"))
+		return OTRL_POLICY_NEVER;
+	if(!strcmp(p, "opportunistic"))
+		return OTRL_POLICY_OPPORTUNISTIC;
+	if(!strcmp(p, "manual"))
+		return OTRL_POLICY_MANUAL;
+	if(!strcmp(p, "always"))
+		return OTRL_POLICY_ALWAYS;
+	
+	return OTRL_POLICY_OPPORTUNISTIC;
+}
+
+void op_create_privkey(void *opdata, const char *accountname,
+	const char *protocol)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic = check_imc(opdata, accountname, protocol);
+	
+	/* will fail silently if keygen already in progress */
+	otr_keygen(ic->irc, accountname, protocol);
+}
+
+int op_is_logged_in(void *opdata, const char *accountname,
+	const char *protocol, const char *recipient)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic = check_imc(opdata, accountname, protocol);
+	user_t *u;
+
+	/* lookup the user_t for the given recipient */
+	u = user_findhandle(ic, recipient);
+	if(u) {
+		if(u->online)
+			return 1;
+		else
+			return 0;
+	} else {
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+void op_inject_message(void *opdata, const char *accountname,
+	const char *protocol, const char *recipient, const char *message)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic = check_imc(opdata, accountname, protocol);
+
+	if (strcmp(accountname, recipient) == 0) {
+		/* huh? injecting messages to myself? */
+		irc_usermsg(ic->irc, "note to self: %s", message);
+	} else {
+		/* need to drop some consts here :-( */
+		/* TODO: get flags into op_inject_message?! */
+		ic->acc->prpl->buddy_msg(ic, (char *)recipient, (char *)message, 0);
+		/* ignoring return value :-/ */
+	}
+}
+
+int op_display_otr_message(void *opdata, const char *accountname,
+	const char *protocol, const char *username, const char *message)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic = check_imc(opdata, accountname, protocol);
+	char *msg = g_strdup(message);
+
+	strip_html(msg);
+	irc_usermsg(ic->irc, "otr: %s", msg);
+
+	g_free(msg);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void op_new_fingerprint(void *opdata, OtrlUserState us,
+	const char *accountname, const char *protocol,
+	const char *username, unsigned char fingerprint[20])
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic = check_imc(opdata, accountname, protocol);
+	char hunam[45];		/* anybody looking? ;-) */
+	
+	otrl_privkey_hash_to_human(hunam, fingerprint);
+	irc_usermsg(ic->irc, "new fingerprint for %s: %s",
+		peernick(ic->irc, username, protocol), hunam);
+}
+
+void op_write_fingerprints(void *opdata)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic = (struct im_connection *)opdata;
+
+	otr_save(ic->irc);
+}
+
+void op_gone_secure(void *opdata, ConnContext *context)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic =
+		check_imc(opdata, context->accountname, context->protocol);
+	user_t *u;
+	const char *trust;
+
+	u = peeruser(ic->irc, context->username, context->protocol);
+	if(!u) {
+		log_message(LOGLVL_ERROR,
+			"BUG: otr.c: op_gone_secure: user_t for %s/%s/%s not found!",
+			context->username, context->protocol, context->accountname);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	trust = context->active_fingerprint->trust;
+	if(trust && trust[0])
+		u->encrypted = 2;
+	else
+		u->encrypted = 1;
+	if(!otr_update_modeflags(ic->irc, u))
+		irc_usermsg(ic->irc, "conversation with %s is now off the record", u->nick);
+}
+
+void op_gone_insecure(void *opdata, ConnContext *context)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic =
+		check_imc(opdata, context->accountname, context->protocol);
+	user_t *u;
+
+	u = peeruser(ic->irc, context->username, context->protocol);
+	if(!u) {
+		log_message(LOGLVL_ERROR,
+			"BUG: otr.c: op_gone_insecure: user_t for %s/%s/%s not found!",
+			context->username, context->protocol, context->accountname);
+		return;
+	}
+	u->encrypted = 0;
+	if(!otr_update_modeflags(ic->irc, u))
+		irc_usermsg(ic->irc, "conversation with %s is now in the clear", u->nick);
+}
+
+void op_still_secure(void *opdata, ConnContext *context, int is_reply)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic =
+		check_imc(opdata, context->accountname, context->protocol);
+	user_t *u;
+
+	u = peeruser(ic->irc, context->username, context->protocol);
+	if(!u) {
+		log_message(LOGLVL_ERROR,
+			"BUG: otr.c: op_still_secure: user_t for %s/%s/%s not found!",
+			context->username, context->protocol, context->accountname);
+		return;
+	}
+	if(context->active_fingerprint->trust[0])
+		u->encrypted = 2;
+	else
+		u->encrypted = 1;
+	if(!otr_update_modeflags(ic->irc, u))
+		irc_usermsg(ic->irc, "otr connection with %s has been refreshed", u->nick);
+}
+
+void op_log_message(void *opdata, const char *message)
+{
+	char *msg = g_strdup(message);
+	
+	strip_html(msg);
+	log_message(LOGLVL_INFO, "otr: %s", msg);
+	g_free(msg);
+}
+
+int op_max_message_size(void *opdata, ConnContext *context)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic =
+		check_imc(opdata, context->accountname, context->protocol);
+
+	return ic->acc->prpl->mms;
+}
+
+const char *op_account_name(void *opdata, const char *account, const char *protocol)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic = (struct im_connection *)opdata;
+
+	return peernick(ic->irc, account, protocol);
+}
+
+
+/*** OTR sub-command handlers ***/
+
+void cmd_otr_disconnect(irc_t *irc, char **args)
+{
+	user_t *u;
+
+	u = user_find(irc, args[1]);
+	if(!u || !u->ic) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: unknown user", args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	otrl_message_disconnect(irc->otr->us, &global.otr_ops,
+		u->ic, u->ic->acc->user, u->ic->acc->prpl->name, u->handle);
+	
+	/* for some reason, libotr (3.1.0) doesn't do this itself: */
+	if(u->encrypted) {
+		ConnContext *ctx;
+		ctx = otrl_context_find(irc->otr->us, u->handle, u->ic->acc->user,
+			u->ic->acc->prpl->name, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if(ctx)
+			op_gone_insecure(u->ic, ctx);
+		else /* huh? */
+			u->encrypted = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+void cmd_otr_connect(irc_t *irc, char **args)
+{
+	user_t *u;
+
+	u = user_find(irc, args[1]);
+	if(!u || !u->ic) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: unknown user", args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	if(!u->online) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s is offline", args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	imc_buddy_msg(u->ic, u->handle, "?OTR?", 0);
+}
+
+void cmd_otr_smp(irc_t *irc, char **args)
+{
+	user_t *u;
+	ConnContext *ctx;
+	
+	u = user_find(irc, args[1]);
+	if(!u || !u->ic) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: unknown user", args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	if(!u->online) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s is offline", args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	ctx = otrl_context_find(irc->otr->us, u->handle,
+		u->ic->acc->user, u->ic->acc->prpl->name, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if(!ctx) {
+		/* huh? out of memory or what? */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if(ctx->smstate->nextExpected != OTRL_SMP_EXPECT1) {
+		log_message(LOGLVL_INFO,
+			"SMP already in phase %d, sending abort before reinitiating",
+			ctx->smstate->nextExpected+1);
+		otrl_message_abort_smp(irc->otr->us, &global.otr_ops, u->ic, ctx);
+		otrl_sm_state_free(ctx->smstate);
+	}
+	
+	/* warning: the following assumes that smstates are cleared whenever an SMP
+	   is completed or aborted! */ 
+	if(ctx->smstate->secret == NULL) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "smp: initiating with %s...", u->nick);
+		otrl_message_initiate_smp(irc->otr->us, &global.otr_ops,
+			u->ic, ctx, (unsigned char *)args[2], strlen(args[2]));
+		/* smp is now in EXPECT2 */
+	} else {
+		/* if we're still in EXPECT1 but smstate is initialized, we must have
+		   received the SMP1, so let's issue a response */
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "smp: responding to %s...", u->nick);
+		otrl_message_respond_smp(irc->otr->us, &global.otr_ops,
+			u->ic, ctx, (unsigned char *)args[2], strlen(args[2]));
+		/* smp is now in EXPECT3 */
+	}
+}
+
+void cmd_otr_trust(irc_t *irc, char **args)
+{
+	user_t *u;
+	ConnContext *ctx;
+	unsigned char raw[20];
+	Fingerprint *fp;
+	int i,j;
+	
+	u = user_find(irc, args[1]);
+	if(!u || !u->ic) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: unknown user", args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	ctx = otrl_context_find(irc->otr->us, u->handle,
+		u->ic->acc->user, u->ic->acc->prpl->name, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if(!ctx) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: no otr context with user", args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	/* convert given fingerprint to raw representation */
+	for(i=0; i<5; i++) {
+		for(j=0; j<4; j++) {
+			char *p = args[2+i]+(2*j);
+			char *q = p+1;
+			int x, y;
+			
+			if(!*p || !*q) {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "failed: truncated fingerprint block %d", i+1);
+				return;
+			}
+			
+			x = hexval(*p);
+			y = hexval(*q);
+			if(x<0) {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "failed: %d. hex digit of block %d out of range", 2*j+1, i+1);
+				return;
+			}
+			if(y<0) {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "failed: %d. hex digit of block %d out of range", 2*j+2, i+1);
+				return;
+			}
+
+			raw[i*4+j] = x*16 + y;
+		}
+	}
+	fp = otrl_context_find_fingerprint(ctx, raw, 0, NULL);
+	if(!fp) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "failed: no such fingerprint for %s", args[1]);
+	} else {
+		char *trust = args[7] ? args[7] : "affirmed";
+		otrl_context_set_trust(fp, trust);
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "fingerprint match, trust set to \"%s\"", trust);
+		if(u->encrypted)
+			u->encrypted = 2;
+		otr_update_modeflags(irc, u);
+	}
+}
+
+void cmd_otr_info(irc_t *irc, char **args)
+{
+	if(!args[1]) {
+		show_general_otr_info(irc);
+	} else {
+		char *arg = g_strdup(args[1]);
+		char *myhandle, *handle=NULL, *protocol;
+		ConnContext *ctx;
+		
+		/* interpret arg as 'user/protocol/account' if possible */
+		protocol = strchr(arg, '/');
+		myhandle = NULL;
+		if(protocol) {
+			*(protocol++) = '\0';
+			myhandle = strchr(protocol, '/');
+		}
+		if(protocol && myhandle) {
+			*(myhandle++) = '\0';
+			handle = arg;
+			ctx = otrl_context_find(irc->otr->us, handle, myhandle, protocol, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			if(!ctx) {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "no such context");
+				g_free(arg);
+				return;
+			}
+		} else {
+			user_t *u = user_find(irc, args[1]);
+			if(!u || !u->ic) {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: unknown user", args[1]);
+				g_free(arg);
+				return;
+			}
+			ctx = otrl_context_find(irc->otr->us, u->handle, u->ic->acc->user,
+				u->ic->acc->prpl->name, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			if(!ctx) {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "no otr context with %s", args[1]);
+				g_free(arg);
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+	
+		/* show how we resolved the (nick) argument, if we did */
+		if(handle!=arg) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "%s is %s/%s; we are %s/%s to them", args[1],
+				ctx->username, ctx->protocol, ctx->accountname, ctx->protocol);
+		}
+		show_otr_context_info(irc, ctx);
+		g_free(arg);
+	}
+}
+
+void cmd_otr_keygen(irc_t *irc, char **args)
+{
+	int i, n;
+	account_t *a;
+	
+	n = atoi(args[1]);
+	if(n<0 || (!n && strcmp(args[1], "0"))) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: invalid account number", args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	a = irc->accounts;
+	for(i=0; i<n && a; i++, a=a->next);
+	if(!a) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: no such account", args[1]);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	if(keygen_in_progress(irc, a->user, a->prpl->name)) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "keygen for account %d already in progress", n);
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	if(otrl_privkey_find(irc->otr->us, a->user, a->prpl->name)) {
+		char *s = g_strdup_printf("account %d already has a key, replace it?", n);
+		query_add(irc, NULL, s, yes_keygen, NULL, a);
+		g_free(s);
+	} else {
+		otr_keygen(irc, a->user, a->prpl->name);
+	}
+}
+
+void yes_forget_fingerprint(void *data)
+{
+	pair_t *p = (pair_t *)data;
+	irc_t *irc = (irc_t *)p->fst;
+	Fingerprint *fp = (Fingerprint *)p->snd;
+
+	g_free(p);
+	
+	if(fp == fp->context->active_fingerprint) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "that fingerprint is active, terminate otr connection first");
+		return;
+	}
+		
+	otrl_context_forget_fingerprint(fp, 0);
+}
+
+void yes_forget_context(void *data)
+{
+	pair_t *p = (pair_t *)data;
+	irc_t *irc = (irc_t *)p->fst;
+	ConnContext *ctx = (ConnContext *)p->snd;
+
+	g_free(p);
+	
+	if(ctx->msgstate == OTRL_MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "active otr connection with %s, terminate it first",
+			peernick(irc, ctx->username, ctx->protocol));
+		return;
+	}
+		
+	if(ctx->msgstate == OTRL_MSGSTATE_FINISHED)
+		otrl_context_force_plaintext(ctx);
+	otrl_context_forget(ctx);
+}
+
+void yes_forget_key(void *data)
+{
+	OtrlPrivKey *key = (OtrlPrivKey *)data;
+	
+	otrl_privkey_forget(key);
+	/* Hm, libotr doesn't seem to offer a function for explicitly /writing/
+	   keyfiles. So the key will be back on the next load... */
+	/* TODO: Actually erase forgotten keys from storage? */
+}
+
+void cmd_otr_forget(irc_t *irc, char **args)
+{
+	if(!strcmp(args[1], "fingerprint"))
+	{
+		user_t *u;
+		ConnContext *ctx;
+		Fingerprint *fp;
+		char human[54];
+		char *s;
+		pair_t *p;
+		
+		if(!args[3]) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "otr %s %s: not enough arguments (2 req.)", args[0], args[1]);
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		/* TODO: allow context specs ("user/proto/account") in 'otr forget fingerprint'? */
+		u = user_find(irc, args[2]);
+		if(!u || !u->ic) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: unknown user", args[2]);
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		ctx = otrl_context_find(irc->otr->us, u->handle, u->ic->acc->user,
+			u->ic->acc->prpl->name, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if(!ctx) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "no otr context with %s", args[2]);
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		fp = match_fingerprint(irc, ctx, ((const char **)args)+3);
+		if(!fp) {
+			/* match_fingerprint does error messages */
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		if(fp == ctx->active_fingerprint) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "that fingerprint is active, terminate otr connection first");
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		otrl_privkey_hash_to_human(human, fp->fingerprint);
+		s = g_strdup_printf("about to forget fingerprint %s, are you sure?", human);
+		p = g_malloc(sizeof(pair_t));
+		if(!p)
+			return;
+		p->fst = irc;
+		p->snd = fp;
+		query_add(irc, NULL, s, yes_forget_fingerprint, NULL, p);
+		g_free(s);
+	}
+	
+	else if(!strcmp(args[1], "context"))
+	{
+		user_t *u;
+		ConnContext *ctx;
+		char *s;
+		pair_t *p;
+		
+		/* TODO: allow context specs ("user/proto/account") in 'otr forget contex'? */
+		u = user_find(irc, args[2]);
+		if(!u || !u->ic) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: unknown user", args[2]);
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		ctx = otrl_context_find(irc->otr->us, u->handle, u->ic->acc->user,
+			u->ic->acc->prpl->name, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if(!ctx) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "no otr context with %s", args[2]);
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		if(ctx->msgstate == OTRL_MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "active otr connection with %s, terminate it first", args[2]);
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		s = g_strdup_printf("about to forget otr data about %s, are you sure?", args[2]);
+		p = g_malloc(sizeof(pair_t));
+		if(!p)
+			return;
+		p->fst = irc;
+		p->snd = ctx;
+		query_add(irc, NULL, s, yes_forget_context, NULL, p);
+		g_free(s);
+	}
+	
+	else if(!strcmp(args[1], "key"))
+	{
+		OtrlPrivKey *key;
+		char *s;
+		
+		key = match_privkey(irc, ((const char **)args)+2);
+		if(!key) {
+			/* match_privkey does error messages */
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		s = g_strdup_printf("about to forget the private key for %s/%s, are you sure?",
+			key->accountname, key->protocol);
+		query_add(irc, NULL, s, yes_forget_key, NULL, key);
+		g_free(s);
+	}
+	
+	else
+	{
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "otr %s: unknown subcommand \"%s\", see \x02help otr forget\x02",
+			args[0], args[1]);
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*** local helpers / subroutines: ***/
+
+/* Socialist Millionaires' Protocol */
+void otr_handle_smp(struct im_connection *ic, const char *handle, OtrlTLV *tlvs)
+{
+	irc_t *irc = ic->irc;
+	OtrlUserState us = irc->otr->us;
+	OtrlMessageAppOps *ops = &global.otr_ops;
+	OtrlTLV *tlv = NULL;
+	ConnContext *context;
+	NextExpectedSMP nextMsg;
+	user_t *u;
+
+	u = user_findhandle(ic, handle);
+	if(!u) return;
+	context = otrl_context_find(us, handle,
+		ic->acc->user, ic->acc->prpl->name, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if(!context) {
+		/* huh? out of memory or what? */
+		return;
+	}
+	nextMsg = context->smstate->nextExpected;
+
+	tlv = otrl_tlv_find(tlvs, OTRL_TLV_SMP1);
+	if (tlv) {
+		if (nextMsg != OTRL_SMP_EXPECT1) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "smp %s: spurious SMP1 received, aborting", u->nick);
+			otrl_message_abort_smp(us, ops, u->ic, context);
+			otrl_sm_state_free(context->smstate);
+		} else {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "smp: initiated by %s"
+				" - respond with \x02otr smp %s <secret>\x02",
+				u->nick, u->nick);
+			/* smp stays in EXPECT1 until user responds */
+		}
+	}
+	tlv = otrl_tlv_find(tlvs, OTRL_TLV_SMP2);
+	if (tlv) {
+		if (nextMsg != OTRL_SMP_EXPECT2) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "smp %s: spurious SMP2 received, aborting", u->nick);
+			otrl_message_abort_smp(us, ops, u->ic, context);
+			otrl_sm_state_free(context->smstate);
+		} else {
+			/* SMP2 received, otrl_message_receiving will have sent SMP3 */
+			context->smstate->nextExpected = OTRL_SMP_EXPECT4;
+		}
+	}
+	tlv = otrl_tlv_find(tlvs, OTRL_TLV_SMP3);
+	if (tlv) {
+		if (nextMsg != OTRL_SMP_EXPECT3) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "smp %s: spurious SMP3 received, aborting", u->nick);
+			otrl_message_abort_smp(us, ops, u->ic, context);
+			otrl_sm_state_free(context->smstate);
+		} else {
+			/* SMP3 received, otrl_message_receiving will have sent SMP4 and set fp trust */
+			const char *trust = context->active_fingerprint->trust;
+			if(!trust || trust[0]=='\0') {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "smp %s: secrets did not match, fingerprint not trusted",
+					u->nick);
+			} else {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "smp %s: secrets proved equal, fingerprint trusted",
+					u->nick);
+			}
+			otrl_sm_state_free(context->smstate);
+			/* smp is in back in EXPECT1 */
+		}
+	}
+	tlv = otrl_tlv_find(tlvs, OTRL_TLV_SMP4);
+	if (tlv) {
+		if (nextMsg != OTRL_SMP_EXPECT4) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "smp %s: spurious SMP4 received, aborting", u->nick);
+			otrl_message_abort_smp(us, ops, u->ic, context);
+			otrl_sm_state_free(context->smstate);
+		} else {
+			/* SMP4 received, otrl_message_receiving will have set fp trust */
+			const char *trust = context->active_fingerprint->trust;
+			if(!trust || trust[0]=='\0') {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "smp %s: secrets did not match, fingerprint not trusted",
+					u->nick);
+			} else {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "smp %s: secrets proved equal, fingerprint trusted",
+					u->nick);
+			}
+			otrl_sm_state_free(context->smstate);
+			/* smp is in back in EXPECT1 */
+		}
+	}
+	tlv = otrl_tlv_find(tlvs, OTRL_TLV_SMP_ABORT);
+	if (tlv) {
+	 	irc_usermsg(irc, "smp: received abort from %s", u->nick);
+		otrl_sm_state_free(context->smstate);
+		/* smp is in back in EXPECT1 */
+	}
+}
+
+/* helper to assert that account and protocol names given to ops below always
+   match the im_connection passed through as opdata */
+struct im_connection *check_imc(void *opdata, const char *accountname,
+	const char *protocol)
+{
+	struct im_connection *ic = (struct im_connection *)opdata;
+
+	if (strcmp(accountname, ic->acc->user) != 0) {
+		log_message(LOGLVL_WARNING,
+			"otr: internal account name mismatch: '%s' vs '%s'",
+			accountname, ic->acc->user);
+	}
+	if (strcmp(protocol, ic->acc->prpl->name) != 0) {
+		log_message(LOGLVL_WARNING,
+			"otr: internal protocol name mismatch: '%s' vs '%s'",
+			protocol, ic->acc->prpl->name);
+	}
+	
+	return ic;
+}
+
+user_t *peeruser(irc_t *irc, const char *handle, const char *protocol)
+{
+	user_t *u;
+	
+	for(u=irc->users; u; u=u->next) {
+		struct prpl *prpl;
+		if(!u->ic || !u->handle)
+			continue;
+		prpl = u->ic->acc->prpl;
+		if(strcmp(prpl->name, protocol) == 0
+			&& prpl->handle_cmp(u->handle, handle) == 0) {
+			return u;
+		}
+	}
+	
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int hexval(char a)
+{
+	int x=tolower(a);
+	
+	if(x>='a' && x<='f')
+		x = x - 'a' + 10;
+	else if(x>='0' && x<='9')
+		x = x - '0';
+	else
+		return -1;
+	
+	return x;
+}
+
+const char *peernick(irc_t *irc, const char *handle, const char *protocol)
+{
+	static char fallback[512];
+	
+	user_t *u = peeruser(irc, handle, protocol);
+	if(u) {
+		return u->nick;
+	} else {
+		g_snprintf(fallback, 511, "%s/%s", handle, protocol);
+		return fallback;
+	}
+}
+
+int otr_update_modeflags(irc_t *irc, user_t *u)
+{
+	char *vb = set_getstr(&irc->set, "voice_buddies");
+	char *hb = set_getstr(&irc->set, "halfop_buddies");
+	char *ob = set_getstr(&irc->set, "op_buddies");
+	int encrypted = u->encrypted;
+	int trusted = u->encrypted > 1;
+	char flags[7];
+	int nflags=0;
+	char *p = flags;
+	char *from;
+	int i;
+	
+	if(!strcmp(vb, "encrypted")) {
+		*(p++) = encrypted ? '+' : '-';
+		*(p++) = 'v';
+		nflags++;
+	} else if(!strcmp(vb, "trusted")) {
+		*(p++) = trusted ? '+' : '-';
+		*(p++) = 'v';
+		nflags++;
+	}
+	if(!strcmp(hb, "encrypted")) {
+		*(p++) = encrypted ? '+' : '-';
+		*(p++) = 'h';
+		nflags++;
+	} else if(!strcmp(hb, "trusted")) {
+		*(p++) = trusted ? '+' : '-';
+		*(p++) = 'h';
+		nflags++;
+	}
+	if(!strcmp(ob, "encrypted")) {
+		*(p++) = encrypted ? '+' : '-';
+		*(p++) = 'o';
+		nflags++;
+	} else if(!strcmp(ob, "trusted")) {
+		*(p++) = trusted ? '+' : '-';
+		*(p++) = 'o';
+		nflags++;
+	}
+	*p = '\0';
+	
+	p = g_malloc(nflags * (strlen(u->nick)+1) + 1);
+	*p = '\0';
+	if(!p)
+		return 0;
+	for(i=0; i<nflags; i++) {
+		strcat(p, " ");
+		strcat(p, u->nick);
+	}
+	if(set_getbool(&irc->set, "simulate_netsplit"))
+		from = g_strdup(irc->myhost);
+	else
+		from = g_strdup_printf("%s!%s@%s", irc->mynick, irc->mynick, irc->myhost);
+	irc_write(irc, ":%s MODE %s %s%s", from, irc->channel, flags, p);
+	g_free(from);
+	g_free(p);
+		
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void show_fingerprints(irc_t *irc, ConnContext *ctx)
+{
+	char human[45];
+	Fingerprint *fp;
+	const char *trust;
+	int count=0;
+	
+	for(fp=&ctx->fingerprint_root; fp; fp=fp->next) {
+		if(!fp->fingerprint)
+			continue;
+		count++;
+		otrl_privkey_hash_to_human(human, fp->fingerprint);
+		if(!fp->trust || fp->trust[0] == '\0') {
+			trust="untrusted";
+		} else {
+			trust=fp->trust;
+		}
+		if(fp == ctx->active_fingerprint) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "    \x02%s (%s)\x02", human, trust);
+		} else {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "    %s (%s)", human, trust);
+		}
+	}
+	if(count==0)
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "    (none)");
+}
+
+Fingerprint *match_fingerprint(irc_t *irc, ConnContext *ctx, const char **args)
+{
+	Fingerprint *fp, *fp2;
+	char human[45];
+	char prefix[45], *p;
+	int n;
+	int i,j;
+	
+	/* assemble the args into a prefix in standard "human" form */
+	n=0;
+	p=prefix;
+	for(i=0; args[i]; i++) {
+		for(j=0; args[i][j]; j++) {
+			char c = toupper(args[i][j]);
+			
+			if(n>=40) {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "too many fingerprint digits given, expected at most 40");
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			
+			if( (c>='A' && c<='F') || (c>='0' && c<='9') ) {
+				*(p++) = c;
+			} else {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "invalid hex digit '%c' in block %d", args[i][j], i+1);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			
+			n++;
+			if(n%8 == 0)
+				*(p++) = ' ';
+		}
+	}
+	*p = '\0';
+	
+	/* find first fingerprint with the given prefix */
+	n = strlen(prefix);
+	for(fp=&ctx->fingerprint_root; fp; fp=fp->next) {
+		if(!fp->fingerprint)
+			continue;
+		otrl_privkey_hash_to_human(human, fp->fingerprint);
+		if(!strncmp(prefix, human, n))
+			break;
+	}
+	if(!fp) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: no match", prefix);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	
+	/* make sure the match, if any, is unique */
+	for(fp2=fp->next; fp2; fp2=fp2->next) {
+		if(!fp2->fingerprint)
+			continue;
+		otrl_privkey_hash_to_human(human, fp2->fingerprint);
+		if(!strncmp(prefix, human, n))
+			break;
+	}
+	if(fp2) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: multiple matches", prefix);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	
+	return fp;
+}
+
+OtrlPrivKey *match_privkey(irc_t *irc, const char **args)
+{
+	OtrlPrivKey *k, *k2;
+	char human[45];
+	char prefix[45], *p;
+	int n;
+	int i,j;
+	
+	/* assemble the args into a prefix in standard "human" form */
+	n=0;
+	p=prefix;
+	for(i=0; args[i]; i++) {
+		for(j=0; args[i][j]; j++) {
+			char c = toupper(args[i][j]);
+			
+			if(n>=40) {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "too many fingerprint digits given, expected at most 40");
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			
+			if( (c>='A' && c<='F') || (c>='0' && c<='9') ) {
+				*(p++) = c;
+			} else {
+				irc_usermsg(irc, "invalid hex digit '%c' in block %d", args[i][j], i+1);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			
+			n++;
+			if(n%8 == 0)
+				*(p++) = ' ';
+		}
+	}
+	*p = '\0';
+	
+	/* find first key which matches the given prefix */
+	n = strlen(prefix);
+	for(k=irc->otr->us->privkey_root; k; k=k->next) {
+		p = otrl_privkey_fingerprint(irc->otr->us, human, k->accountname, k->protocol);
+		if(!p) /* gah! :-P */
+			continue;
+		if(!strncmp(prefix, human, n))
+			break;
+	}
+	if(!k) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: no match", prefix);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	
+	/* make sure the match, if any, is unique */
+	for(k2=k->next; k2; k2=k2->next) {
+		p = otrl_privkey_fingerprint(irc->otr->us, human, k2->accountname, k2->protocol);
+		if(!p) /* gah! :-P */
+			continue;
+		if(!strncmp(prefix, human, n))
+			break;
+	}
+	if(k2) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "%s: multiple matches", prefix);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	
+	return k;
+}
+
+void show_general_otr_info(irc_t *irc)
+{
+	ConnContext *ctx;
+	OtrlPrivKey *key;
+	char human[45];
+	kg_t *kg;
+
+	/* list all privkeys (including ones being generated) */
+	irc_usermsg(irc, "\x1fprivate keys:\x1f");
+	for(key=irc->otr->us->privkey_root; key; key=key->next) {
+		const char *hash;
+		
+		switch(key->pubkey_type) {
+		case OTRL_PUBKEY_TYPE_DSA:
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "  %s/%s - DSA", key->accountname, key->protocol);
+			break;
+		default:
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "  %s/%s - type %d", key->accountname, key->protocol,
+				key->pubkey_type);
+		}
+
+		/* No, it doesn't make much sense to search for the privkey again by
+		   account/protocol, but libotr currently doesn't provide a direct routine
+		   for hashing a given 'OtrlPrivKey'... */
+		hash = otrl_privkey_fingerprint(irc->otr->us, human, key->accountname, key->protocol);
+		if(hash) /* should always succeed */
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "    %s", human);
+	}
+	if(irc->otr->sent_accountname) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  %s/%s - DSA", irc->otr->sent_accountname,
+			irc->otr->sent_protocol);
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "    (being generated)");
+	}
+	for(kg=irc->otr->todo; kg; kg=kg->next) {
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  %s/%s - DSA", kg->accountname, kg->protocol);
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "    (queued)");
+	}
+	if(key == irc->otr->us->privkey_root &&
+	   !irc->otr->sent_accountname &&
+	   kg == irc->otr->todo)
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  (none)");
+
+	/* list all contexts */
+	irc_usermsg(irc, "%s", "");
+	irc_usermsg(irc, "\x1f" "connection contexts:\x1f (bold=currently encrypted)");
+	for(ctx=irc->otr->us->context_root; ctx; ctx=ctx->next) {\
+		user_t *u;
+		char *userstring;
+		
+		u = peeruser(irc, ctx->username, ctx->protocol);
+		if(u)
+			userstring = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s/%s (%s)",
+				ctx->username, ctx->protocol, ctx->accountname, u->nick);
+		else
+			userstring = g_strdup_printf("%s/%s/%s",
+				ctx->username, ctx->protocol, ctx->accountname);
+		
+		if(ctx->msgstate == OTRL_MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "  \x02%s\x02", userstring);
+		} else {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "  %s", userstring);
+		}
+		
+		g_free(userstring);
+	}
+	if(ctx == irc->otr->us->context_root)
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  (none)");
+}
+
+void show_otr_context_info(irc_t *irc, ConnContext *ctx)
+{
+	switch(ctx->otr_offer) {
+	case OFFER_NOT:
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  otr offer status: none sent");
+		break;
+	case OFFER_SENT:
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  otr offer status: awaiting reply");
+		break;
+	case OFFER_ACCEPTED:
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  otr offer status: accepted our offer");
+		break;
+	case OFFER_REJECTED:
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  otr offer status: ignored our offer");
+		break;
+	default:
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  otr offer status: %d", ctx->otr_offer);
+	}
+
+	switch(ctx->msgstate) {
+	case OTRL_MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT:
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  connection state: cleartext");
+		break;
+	case OTRL_MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED:
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  connection state: encrypted (v%d)", ctx->protocol_version);
+		break;
+	case OTRL_MSGSTATE_FINISHED:
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  connection state: shut down");
+		break;
+	default:
+		irc_usermsg(irc, "  connection state: %d", ctx->msgstate);
+	}
+
+	irc_usermsg(irc, "  fingerprints: (bold=active)");	
+	show_fingerprints(irc, ctx);
+}
+
+int keygen_in_progress(irc_t *irc, const char *handle, const char *protocol)
+{
+	kg_t *kg;
+	
+	if(!irc->otr->sent_accountname || !irc->otr->sent_protocol)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* are we currently working on this key? */
+	if(!strcmp(handle, irc->otr->sent_accountname) &&
+	   !strcmp(protocol, irc->otr->sent_protocol))
+		return 1;
+	
+	/* do we have it queued for later? */
+	for(kg=irc->otr->todo; kg; kg=kg->next) {
+		if(!strcmp(handle, kg->accountname) &&
+		   !strcmp(protocol, kg->protocol))
+			return 1;
+	}
+	
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void otr_keygen(irc_t *irc, const char *handle, const char *protocol)
+{
+	/* do nothing if a key for the requested account is already being generated */
+	if(keygen_in_progress(irc, handle, protocol))
+		return;
+
+	/* see if we already have a keygen child running. if not, start one and put a
+	   handler on its output. */
+	if(!irc->otr->keygen || waitpid(irc->otr->keygen, NULL, WNOHANG)) {
+		pid_t p;
+		int to[2], from[2];
+		FILE *tof, *fromf;
+		
+		if(pipe(to) < 0 || pipe(from) < 0) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "otr keygen: couldn't create pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		tof = fdopen(to[1], "w");
+		fromf = fdopen(from[0], "r");
+		if(!tof || !fromf) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "otr keygen: couldn't streamify pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		p = fork();
+		if(p<0) {
+			irc_usermsg(irc, "otr keygen: couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+			return;
+		}
+		
+		if(!p) {
+			/* child process */
+			signal(SIGTERM, exit);
+			keygen_child_main(irc->otr->us, to[0], from[1]);
+			exit(0);
+		}
+		
+		irc->otr->keygen = p;
+		irc->otr->to = tof;
+		irc->otr->from = fromf;
+		irc->otr->sent_accountname = NULL;
+		irc->otr->sent_protocol = NULL;
+		irc->otr->todo = NULL;
+		b_input_add(from[0], GAIM_INPUT_READ, keygen_finish_handler, irc);
+	}
+	
+	/* is the keygen slave currently working? */
+	if(irc->otr->sent_accountname) {
+		/* enqueue our job for later transmission */
+		kg_t **kg = &irc->otr->todo;
+		while(*kg)
+			kg=&((*kg)->next);
+		*kg = g_new0(kg_t, 1);
+		(*kg)->accountname = g_strdup(handle);
+		(*kg)->protocol = g_strdup(protocol);
+	} else {
+		/* send our job over and remember it */
+		fprintf(irc->otr->to, "%s\n%s\n", handle, protocol);
+		fflush(irc->otr->to);
+		irc->otr->sent_accountname = g_strdup(handle);
+		irc->otr->sent_protocol = g_strdup(protocol);
+	}
+}
+
+void keygen_child_main(OtrlUserState us, int infd, int outfd)
+{
+	FILE *input, *output;
+	char filename[128], accountname[512], protocol[512];
+	gcry_error_t e;
+	int tempfd;
+	
+	input = fdopen(infd, "r");
+	output = fdopen(outfd, "w");
+	
+	while(!feof(input) && !ferror(input) && !feof(output) && !ferror(output)) {
+		myfgets(accountname, 512, input);
+		myfgets(protocol, 512, input);
+		
+		strncpy(filename, "/tmp/bitlbee-XXXXXX", 128);
+		tempfd = mkstemp(filename);
+		close(tempfd);
+
+		e = otrl_privkey_generate(us, filename, accountname, protocol);
+		if(e) {
+			fprintf(output, "\n");  /* this means failure */
+			fprintf(output, "otr keygen: %s\n", gcry_strerror(e));
+			unlink(filename);
+		} else {
+			fprintf(output, "%s\n", filename);
+			fprintf(output, "otr keygen for %s/%s complete\n", accountname, protocol);
+		}
+		fflush(output);
+	}
+	
+	fclose(input);
+	fclose(output);
+}
+
+gboolean keygen_finish_handler(gpointer data, gint fd, b_input_condition cond)
+{
+	irc_t *irc = (irc_t *)data;
+	char filename[512], msg[512];
+
+	myfgets(filename, 512, irc->otr->from);
+	myfgets(msg, 512, irc->otr->from);
+	
+	irc_usermsg(irc, "%s", msg);
+	if(filename[0]) {
+		char *kf = g_strdup_printf("%s%s.otr_keys", global.conf->configdir, irc->nick);
+		char *tmp = g_strdup_printf("%s.new", kf);
+		copyfile(filename, tmp);
+		unlink(filename);
+		rename(tmp,kf);
+		otrl_privkey_read(irc->otr->us, kf);
+		g_free(kf);
+		g_free(tmp);
+	}
+	
+	/* forget this job */
+	g_free(irc->otr->sent_accountname);
+	g_free(irc->otr->sent_protocol);
+	irc->otr->sent_accountname = NULL;
+	irc->otr->sent_protocol = NULL;
+	
+	/* see if there are any more in the queue */
+	if(irc->otr->todo) {
+		kg_t *p = irc->otr->todo;
+		/* send the next one over */
+		fprintf(irc->otr->to, "%s\n%s\n", p->accountname, p->protocol);
+		fflush(irc->otr->to);
+		irc->otr->sent_accountname = p->accountname;
+		irc->otr->sent_protocol = p->protocol;
+		irc->otr->todo = p->next;
+		g_free(p);
+		return TRUE;   /* keep watching */
+	} else {
+		/* okay, the slave is idle now, so kill him */
+		fclose(irc->otr->from);
+		fclose(irc->otr->to);
+		kill(irc->otr->keygen, SIGTERM);
+		waitpid(irc->otr->keygen, NULL, 0);
+		irc->otr->keygen = 0;
+		return FALSE;  /* unregister ourselves */
+	}
+}
+
+void copyfile(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+	int fda, fdb;
+	int n;
+	char buf[1024];
+	
+	fda = open(a, O_RDONLY);
+	fdb = open(b, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
+	
+	while((n=read(fda, buf, 1024)) > 0)
+		write(fdb, buf, n);
+	
+	close(fda);
+	close(fdb);	
+}
+
+void myfgets(char *s, int size, FILE *stream)
+{
+	if(!fgets(s, size, stream)) {
+		s[0] = '\0';
+	} else {
+		int n = strlen(s);
+		if(n>0 && s[n-1] == '\n')
+			s[n-1] = '\0';
+	}
+}
+
+void yes_keygen(void *data)
+{
+	account_t *acc = (account_t *)data;
+	
+	if(keygen_in_progress(acc->irc, acc->user, acc->prpl->name)) {
+		irc_usermsg(acc->irc, "keygen for %s/%s already in progress",
+			acc->user, acc->prpl->name);
+	} else {
+		irc_usermsg(acc->irc, "starting background keygen for %s/%s",
+			acc->user, acc->prpl->name);
+		irc_usermsg(acc->irc, "you will be notified when it completes");
+		otr_keygen(acc->irc, acc->user, acc->prpl->name);
+	}
+}
+
+
+#else /* WITH_OTR undefined */
+
+void cmd_otr(irc_t *irc, char **args)
+{
+	irc_usermsg(irc, "otr: n/a, compiled without OTR support");
+}
+
+#endif